Anders Wivel Security Strategy and American World Order, Lost Power (2008)

Odnośniki

[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

September 1989 Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze informed his
American counterpart, James Baker, that the Soviet Union would give up its
demands about how the United States developed its strategic missile defence
initiative (SDI) (Rich 2003: 492), and Moscow no longer considered SDI as an
obstacle to a START treaty. In doing so, the Soviet Union surrendered its long-
time goal of nuclear parity with the United States, since Moscow accepted that
the United States could possess nuclear defence systems that were beyond the
reach of the Soviet Union (Hansen 2000c: 78). Elements of soft bandwagoning
became even more evident in Soviet strategy in terms of the collapse of the
German Democratic Republic in November 1989 (Rich 2003: 536). Moscow
had crushed all previous public protests against the Communist regimes in
Eastern Europe; in East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland. In
1989, however, Soviet troops remained in the barracks and looked on as the
German Democratic Republic (GDR) regime was swept from power, thus clear-
ing the path for German re-unification. Although reluctantly so, the Soviet
Union went along with German re-unification and a unified Germany that could
remain within NATO. A long-time precondition for Moscow to accept German
unification had been German neutrality (Rich, 2003: 330). Abandoning this con-
dition meant the massive revision of Soviet security strategy. Equally astonish-
ing was the Soviet acceptance of the US leadership in the international coalition
to expel the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in January 1991 (Rich, 2003: 504,
529 530); something that would have been difficult to imagine just a few years
before. Moreover, to help build mutual trust after years of bitter rivalry and to
manage the transition to a new security landscape after the Cold War, the Soviet
government was positive towards proposals from NATO concerning the estab-
lishment of a North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in November 1991.
The primary aim of the NACC was to serve as a consultative arena for discus-
sions on European security, thereby helping to build trust between NATO and
the Warsaw Pact (Bowker 1995; NATO 2004b: 82).
In short, in terms of balancing and bandwagoning, Soviet-Russian strategy
changed from balancing to bandwagoning around 1989 90. As the Soviet
Empire was beginning to unravel in 1990 and 1991, the USSR had thus switched
to a grand strategy in line with the major American policy preferences
(Goldgeier and Mcfaul 2003: 21). Soviet bandwagoning was of a soft variety,
because although Soviet-Russia made key revisions in its security strategy in
line with Western priorities, Moscow did not seek any close military relationship
or alliances with the United States.
38 Russia
Abandoning bandwagoning: Russian relations with the major powers
after 1991
During the 1992 2007 period, the Russian strategy towards the US world order
may best be described as shifting from one of soft- and almost hard bandwago-
ning in the very early 1990s to one of soft balancing from the mid-1990s until
2007. In the following pages, we substantiate this conclusion by analysing key
issues and trends in the interactions of Russia with the dominant states in the
post-Soviet 1991 2007 period: the United States, its major European allies,
China, India and Japan.14
Russia and the US unipole
During the first couple of years after the end of the Cold War and the Soviet dis-
solution, the Russian government of newly elected President Boris Yeltsin
picked up where Gorbachev had left. Yeltsin s team of liberal reformers focused
on transforming Russian society along western lines and deepened relations with
the West. They pursued an almost unqualified pro-Western course which broke
with Gorbachev s more conditional approach. Western advisors were thus
invited to assist Russia in its difficult economic and democratic transition from a
planned economy and one-party state towards a democratic country with a
market economy (Goldgeier and Mcfaul 2003: 66 67). Moreover, the Yeltsin
team even sought to establish a special strategic partnership with NATO,
allegedly even hoping for some kind of Russia US alliance (Goldgeier and
McFaul 2003: 50, 53 54). Furthermore, Moscow pressed ahead with ratifying
the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START I) and was positive towards
opening negotiations for a START II that would bring an end to the nuclear
arms race (Falkenrath 1995: 119 120, 124). In terms of bandwagoning and bal-
ancing, there is little question that this strategy may be branded bandwagoning,
as Russia aligned itself closely with the foreign policy positions of the United
States and its NATO allies. Moreover, because the Russian government was
contemplating forging a military alliance with the United States (not seriously
considered in Washington, however) Russian bandwagoning even had traces of
hard bandwagoning.
This honeymoon phase did not last for very long, however. By 1994, Russia
had abandoned its unqualified support for US objectives and began opposing US
policies on a number of issues. The NATO strategy to end the Bosnian civil war
was the first of such issues in which Russia took a decidedly different view than
the United States in the post-Cold War order.
Russian opposition to the NATO use of force in Bosnia
Despite its previous acceptance of the US position on international security
issues, Russia came to differ strongly with the United States and its NATO allies
in 1994. Disagreement was rooted in the question about whether to exercise mil-
Russia 39
itary might to bring the civil war in Bosnia to an end. In tandem with NATO
enlargement, that was becoming ever more real at the same time disagreement
over Bosnia reflected a shift in the Russian strategy of bandwagoning towards
balancing.
Yugoslavia collapsed into its constituent parts in 1991/92. In Bosnia and
Croatia, civil war broke out between ethnic Serbs, Croats and Muslim Bosnians.
The longest fighting took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The EU and UN
attempted to negotiate a peace plan, but this was rejected by the warring parties.
Preoccupied with its domestic transition, the Russian government assumed a
relatively passive stance vis-�-vis the Yugoslavian crisis in its first phase during
1992 93. Russia supported all of the key UN resolutions, e.g. Resolution 713,
which imposed a weapons embargo on Yugoslavia, as well as Resolution 743,
which established a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to protect
civilians in the conflict. Moscow also supported Resolution 819, which called
for the establishment of safe havens (United Nations Security Council). Cru-
cially, Russia endorsed UN Resolution 836 (1993), which expanded the
UNPROFOR mandate to deter attacks, including the use of air strikes by NATO
and other regional security organizations (UN Security Council).
By early 1994, fighting in Bosnia intensified and it became clear that
UNPROFOR was unable to enforce the designated safe areas. At this point, the
United States decided to become more actively involved. At a NATO summit in
January 1994, Washington proposed to employ NATO air power to enforce the [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

zanotowane.pl

doc.pisz.pl

pdf.pisz.pl

angamoss.xlx.pl