eBook Hegel Philosophy of Mind

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interpreted by the representing intellect. Now in the shape of mechanical memory, intelligence is at once that
external objectivity and the meaning. In this way intelligence is explicitly made an existence of this identity,
i.e. it is explicitly active as such an identity which as reason it is implicitly. Memory is in this manner the
passage into the function of thought, which no longer has a meaning, i.e. its objectivity is no longer severed
from the subjective, and its inwardness does not need to go outside for its existence.
The German language has etymologically assigned memory (Gedachtnis), of which it has become a foregone
conclusion to speak contemptuously, the high position of direct kindred with thought (Gedanke). - It is not
matter of chance that the young have a better memory than the old, nor is their memory solely exercised for
the sake of utility. The young have a good memory because they have not yet reached the stage of reflection;
their memory is exercised with or without design so as to level the ground of their inner life to pure being or
to pure space in which the fact, the implicit content, may reign and unfold itself with no antithesis to a
subjective inwardness. Genuine ability is in youth generally combined with a good memory. But empirical
statements of this sort help little towards a knowledge of what memory intrinsically is. To comprehend the
position and meaning of memory and to understand its organic interconnection with thought is one of the
hardest points, and hitherto one quite unregarded in the theory of mind. Memory qua memory is itself the
merely external mode, or merely existential aspect of thought, and thus needs a complementary element. The
passage from it to thought is to our view or implicitly the identity of reason with this existential mode: an
identity from which it follows that reason only exists in a subject, and as the function of that subject. Thus
active reason is Thinking.
(c) Thinking(11)
� 465 Intelligence is recognitive: it cognizes an intuition, but only because that intuition is already its own (�
454); and in the name it rediscovers the fact (� 462): but now it finds its universal in the double signification
of the universal as such, and of the universal as immediate or as being - finds that is the genuine universal
which is its own unity overlapping and including its other, viz. being. Thus intelligence is explicitly, and on
its own part cognitive: virtually it is the universal - its product (the thought) is the thing: it is a plain identity
of subjective and objective. It knows that what is thought, is, and that what is, only is in so far as it is a
thought (�� 5, 21); the thinking of intelligence is to have thoughts: these are as its content and object.
� 466 But cognition by thought is still in the first instance formal: the universality and its being is the plain
subjectivity of intelligence. The thoughts therefore are not yet fully and freely determinate, and the
representations which have been inwardized to thoughts are so far still the given content.
� 467 As dealing with this given content, thought is (a) understanding with its formal identity, working up the
representations, that have been memorized, into species, genera, laws, forces, etc., in short into categories -
SUB-SECTION C. PSYCHOLOGY, MIND 35
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
thus indicating that the raw material does not get the truth of its being save in these thought-forms. As
intrinsically infinite negativity, thought is (b) essentially an act of partition - judgement, which, however,
does not break up the concept again into the old antithesis of universality and being, but distinguishes on the
lines supplied by the interconnections peculiar to the concept. Thirdly (c), thought supersedes the formal
distinction and institutes at the same time an identity of the differences - thus being nominal reason or
inferential understanding. Intelligence, as the act of thought, cognizes. And (a) understanding out of its
generalities (the categories) explains the individual, and is then said to comprehend or understand itself: (b) in
the judgement it explains the individual to be a universal (species, genus). In these forms the content appears
as given: (c) but in inference (syllogism) it characterizes a content from itself, by superseding that
form-difference. With the perception of the necessity, the last immediacy still attaching to formal thought
has vanished.
In Logic there was thought, but in its implicitness, and as reason develops itself in this distinction-lacking
medium. So in consciousness thought occurs as a stage (� 437 note). Here reason is as the truth of the
antithetical distinction, as it had taken shape within the mind's own limits. Thought thus recurs again and [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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